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ABSTRACT 
In recent months, Wall Street has been whipped into a frenzy 
following the March 31st release of Michael Lewis’ book “Flash 
Boys.” In the book, Lewis characterizes the stock market as 
being rigged, which has institutional investors and outside 
observers alike demanding some sort of SEC action. The vast 
majority of this criticism is aimed at high-frequency traders, who 
use complex computer algorithms to execute trades several times 
faster than the blink of an eye. One of the many complaints 
against high-frequency traders is over parasitic trading 
practices, such as front-running. Front-running, in the era of 
high-frequency trading, is best defined as using the knowledge of 
a large impending trade to take a favorable position in the 
market before that trade is executed. Put simply, these traders 
are able to jump in front of a trade before it can be completed. 
This Note explains how high-frequency traders are able to front-
run trades using superior access to information, and examines 
several proposed SEC responses.  
INTRODUCTION 
 If asked to envision what trading looks like on the New York 
Stock Exchange, most people who do not follow the U.S. securities 
market would likely picture a bunch of brokers standing around on the 
trading floor, yelling and waving pieces of paper in the air. Ten years ago 
they would have been absolutely right, but the stock market has 
undergone radical changes in the last decade. It has shifted from one 
dominated by manual trading at a physical location to a vast network of 
interconnected and automated trading systems.1  
 Technological advances that simplified how orders are 
generated, routed, and executed have fostered the changes in market 
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structure, and led to a fragmented marketplace composed of several 
exchanges all competing for trade volume.2 For instance, the top three 
exchanges by trade volume (NASDAQ, NYSE, and BATS) account for 
only 43.6% of total trading volume.3 This fragmentation was further 
driven by SEC instituted regulations that were designed to foster 
competition between the exchanges after their privatization in 2005,4 
known as Regulation NMS, or National Market System.5 
 SEC regulation spread the market out, while changes in 
technology ballooned the amount of trading and greatly increased the 
speed at which it could be done. For instance, in 2005 the NYSE 
accounted for over three-quarters of the stock market’s trade volume.6 By 
2009 that number had fallen to just 25%; however, average daily trade 
volume for the same period had increased more than 650%. 7 
Additionally, the time needed to execute a trade for an NYSE listed stock 
decreased from an average of ten seconds in 2005 to mere fractions of a 
second in 2009.8 
 This reduction in latency, or trading speed, coupled with the 
increased fragmentation and competition between exchanges in recent 
years, has given rise to a new phenomenon known as high-frequency 
trading (HFT).9 HFT does not have an official definition, but is widely 
believed to have a few common characteristics.10 First, high-frequency 
traders employ complex computer algorithms that use a defined set of 
inputs to automatically make decisions based on changing market 
conditions. 11  Second, they make trades very quickly, measured in 
milliseconds and even microseconds.12 To put this into perspective, the 
                                                      
2  See, e.g., Peter Gomber et al., High-Frequency Trading 6 (Mar. 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858626. 
3 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3595. 
4 Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 523, 533 (2014). 
5 See Regulation NMS Release No. 34,51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,497–99 
(June 29, 2005). 
6 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3595.  
7 Id. 
8 Id.; How the Market Works: The Market of Innovation, NASDAQ, http://www. 
nasdaq.com/services/homw.stm (last visited Dec. 28, 2015). 
9 See, e.g., Gomber et al., supra note 2. 
10 For the remainder of the paper “HFT” will be used to denote the practice of 
high-frequency trading, and “HFTs” will be used in place of high-frequency 
traders, or those who participate in high-frequency trading. 
11 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3606. 
12 See, e.g., Frank J. Fabozzi, Sergio M. Focardi & Caroline Jonas, High-
Frequency Trading: Methodologies and Market Impact, 19 REV. OF FUTURES 
MKTS. (SPECIAL EDITION) 8 (June 2011). 
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average blink of a human eye takes about 400 milliseconds, which is an 
eternity to high-frequency traders. 13  Third, they execute a massive 
number of trades per day. While it is quite difficult to estimate how many 
trades the average HFT firm executes per day, it is estimated that HFT as 
a whole accounts for 50–70% of the total trading volume in the U.S. 
equities market.14 Fourth, these firms do not hold a position at the end of 
the trading day. That is, unlike traditional investors, they do not hold a 
significant number of shares of any stock at the end of each day. And 
finally, high-frequency traders are proprietary traders, which means, they 
are trading with their own money, rather than on behalf of an investor.15 
While most high-frequency traders share these characteristics, 
the trading strategies they use vary widely.16 Many of these strategies 
have been labeled as parasitic,17 and are one of the many reasons HFT 
has come under fire recently.18 Parasitic strategies are generally thought 
of as those designed to generate profits at the expense of other traders, 
without providing some market benefit in return.19 Although the full 
merits of HFT are outside the scope of this paper, it will instead focus on 
one of the parasitic trading practices employed, known as front-running.  
Front-running is defined as using the knowledge of a large, 
incoming order to take a favorable position in the market.20 Put simply, 
knowing that a large order is incoming, front-running constitutes buying 
and immediately relisting that particular stock at a higher price, before 
the order is executed. A simple analogy may help illustrate the issue. 
Imagine a stockbroker with a serious craving for Cheerios. That broker 
                                                      
13 MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 72 (W.W. Norton & 
Co. 2014). 
14 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3606; Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, 
supra note 13. 
15 See, e.g., Diego Leis, High Frequency Trading Market Manipulation and 
Systemic Risks From an EU Perspective 20 (Feb. 29, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2108344. 
16 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3607–09. 
17 For example, “order anticipation strategies” such as front-running attempt to 
predict or sniff out what other traders are doing, and trade in front of them. 
Similarly, “momentary ignition strategies” attempt to fool others that a market 
shift is taking place by rapidly placing and canceling a large number  
of orders. See, e.g., LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET 
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 245 (2002); SEC Concept Release, 
supra note 1, at 3609. 
18 See generally Álvaro Cartea & José Penalva, Where is the Value in High 
Frequency Trading? 2–3 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1712765. 
19 See, Korsmo, supra note 4, at 557.  
20 Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 24. 
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checks the price for Cheerios on his phone and sees that they are on sale 
for $2.49 at the nearest grocery store. He then places an order for one 
box of Cheerios and heads to the store to pick them up. When he gets 
there, the manager informs him that unfortunately someone had 
purchased all of the boxes of $2.49 cheerios before they were able to fill 
his order. Fortunately, however, that same person is happy to sell him a 
box for $2.50. Switch Cheerios with shares of Apple, and you have front-
running in a nutshell, sometimes referred to as an “order-anticipation 
strategy.”21 Since it is a parasitic trading strategy, front-running does not 
provide any offsetting benefit to the marketplace. Front-runners “profit 
only when they can prey on other traders. They do not make prices more 
informative, and they do not make markets more liquid.”22 Now in the 
analogy above, one cent may not seem like a big deal, but when the 
broker starts buying 10,000 or 100,000 boxes of Cheerios at a time, the 
issue becomes more apparent.  
 In the wake of Michael Lewis’ book “Flash Boys,”23 several 
predatory strategies have been incorrectly labeled as front-running. 
While rebate-arbitrage, 24  latency-arbitrage, 25  and a myriad of other 
predatory trading strategies are employed by high–frequency traders, 
they do not fall under the domain of order-anticipation strategies, and 
thus will not be discussed in this piece. Part I of this Note begins by 
briefly explaining the current market structure of the U.S. equities 
markets, and highlighting some key regulations in its operation. Part II 
moves to discuss exactly how these trades are being front-run and why 
this is an issue worth correcting. Part III details what enables high-
frequency traders to front-run trades, and Part IV concludes with a 
discussion of potential SEC responses.  
I. CURRENT MARKET STRUCTURE 
 The current structure of the U.S. equities market and certain key 
regulatory provisions create an environment that makes front-running 
                                                      
21 See, e.g., Richard Livingston, Murky Dangers in Dark Pools, THEAGE (Aug. 
25, 2012), http://www.theage.com.au/money/investing/murky-dangers-in-dark-
pools-20120827-24v9n.html (providing a similar analogy). 
22 HARRIS, supra note 17, at 251. 
23 LEWIS, supra note 13. 
24 Rebate-arbitrage is a trading strategy that seeks to capture the incentives, or 
kickbacks, many exchanges offer for trading on their exchange without actually 
providing the liquidity or volume those incentives are meant to entice. See id. at 
172. 
25 Latency-arbitrage is generally defined as using extremely fast trading speed to 
capture differences in price on multiple exchanges before the exchanges are able 
to update listings to reflect the current best market price. See Gomber et al., 
supra note 2, at 29–30. 
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possible. The vast majority of equities trading in the U.S. takes place on 
one of the nine registered exchanges (e.g., NYSE), or in a dark pool.26 
Registered exchanges, as the name implies, have to register with the SEC 
and meet certain statutory requirements.27 Dark pools on the other hand, 
are essentially unofficial exchanges that are less heavily regulated, and 
offer a certain amount of anonymity that is not found on the official 
exchanges.28 Both the registered exchanges and dark pools are run by an 
automated trading system (ATS) that automatically receives, processes, 
and executes orders at extremely high speeds.29 Additionally, registered 
exchanges and dark pools are governed by Regulation NMS, or National 
Market System, though there are some important differences.30  
 Regulation NMS was designed to create a linked national market 
system and foster competition among the exchanges. 31   This was 
accomplished primarily in two ways. First, Regulation NMS created a 
consolidated market data system.32 This system collects “consolidated 
quote data” and “consolidated trade data.”33 Consolidated quote data is 
the record of all the best bids and offers from each of the registered 
exchanges.34 Consolidated trade data is the record of every trade that is 
executed, even on dark pools or other alternative trading systems.35 This 
distinction is the major difference between the registered exchanges and 
dark pools. Dark pools are not required to report bids and offers 
(consolidated quote data); as such, investors can remain somewhat 
anonymous and forgo tipping off the market about a large incoming 
trade.36  
 All of this data is combined into a consolidated data feed, also 
known as the Securities Information Processor (SIP), and made available 
to all market participants.37 The SIP combines the data from each of the 
exchanges to calculate, among other things, the National Best Bid and 
                                                      
26 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3597–98. 
27 See id. at 3598. 
28 Edwin Batista, Note, A Shot in the Dark: An Analysis of the SEC's Response 
to the Rise of Dark Pools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83 (2014). 
29 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3598. 
30 Id. at 3600–01. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Batista, supra note 28; Korsmo, supra note 4, at 535. 
37 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01; What is a SIP and What 
Role Should it Play?, MODERN MARKETS INITIATIVE (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://modernmarketsinitiative.org/sip-role-play [hereinafter What is a SIP?]. 
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Offer prices (NBBO).38 The NBBO is the current best bid and offer price 
(to buy and sell, respectively) of every listed stock.39  
 Second, Regulation NMS implemented something known as the 
“Order Protection Rule.”40 This rule requires that any trading venue must 
execute an order at the current best price in the nation, or the NBBO.41 If 
the venue is unable to do that, (for instance, if the national best price is 
not offered on their exchange, or if there are not enough shares to fill the 
order) it must either cancel the order or route it to another exchange with 
the best price.42 Both the consolidated data market system and the Order 
Protection Rule have been fundamental to the rise of front-running 
activity in recent years.  
II. FRONT-RUNNING 
 Front-running in the U.S. equities market has developed into a 
high-stakes cat and mouse game. As investors discover they are being 
front-run, they explore new ways of executing their orders; and in turn, 
high-frequency traders develop new tools and methods to front-run 
them.43 Currently there are three known ways in which front-running 
occurs, depending on how brokers execute the orders; however, the 
nature of this trade practice makes it impossible to say whether this is an 
exhaustive list. 44  The first two methods are variations of what is 
generally known as electronic front-running, while the third is called 
dark pool arbitrage.  
A. Electronic Front-Running 
1. Large Block Orders 
 The first widely used method of front-running (though used less 
often in light of recent events) occurs when an investor submits an order 
                                                      
38 What is a SIP?, supra note 37; Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence 
Hendershott, How Slow Is the NBBO? A Comparison with Direct Exchange 
Feeds, 49 THE FIN. REV. 313–14 (2014). 
39 Ding, Hanna & Hendershott, supra note 38. 
40 See Regulation NMS Release No. 34,51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,501–02 
(June 29, 2005).  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 It is worth noting that the investors mentioned here are large institutional 
investors. Someone trading for his or her personal account, or in relatively small 
quantities is at no risk for being front-run. However, this is still relevant to these 
individuals, as a large number of institutional investors are pension and 
retirement funds.  
44 See Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25; Leis, supra note 15, at 21. 
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for a large block of shares.45 Assume that a broker has a client who wants 
him to buy 100,000 shares of XYZ Company. The broker checks the 
price of XYZ and sees that there are 180,000 shares available at $10.50: 
30,000 shares on Exchange 1, 50,000 on Exchange 2, 60,000 on 
Exchange 3, and 40,000 on Exchange 4. He submits the order at market 
price expecting to receive 100,000 shares for $1,050,000, but instead 
somehow ends up paying $1,051,400. Why?  
 Before the broker ever placed the order, some (or many) high-
frequency traders placed a large amount of sell orders in a huge selection 
of stocks, one of which happened to be XYZ Company.46 These sell 
orders are usually in lots of 100 shares, the minimum required to be at 
the front of any price queue.47 As the broker’s 100,000 share order came 
into Exchange 1, he purchased all 30,000 shares available at $10.50, 
including the sell order from the high-frequency trader. Because 
Exchange 1 is not able to fill the entire order at the NBBO, the Order 
Protection Rule requires it to send the order elsewhere to get the 
remaining 70,000 shares. Now, armed with the knowledge that this order 
is on its way to the next exchange, the high-frequency traders race there 
before it can be executed and purchase all the available shares of the 
stock.48 At this point, they can either sell the shares back to the broker at 
an inflated price, say $10.52, or hold them in hopes that the large order 
drives the price up even higher.49 
2. Sliced Orders 
 Often times it is not feasible to submit a large block order, such 
as when there are not enough shares available at the preferred price.50 In 
these instances traders often “slice” their orders or use an algorithm to 
break them into smaller pieces that match the market and do not move 
the price.51 For example, assume once more that a broker is trying to buy 
                                                      
45 The remainder of the examples will talk exclusively about bids, or purchase 
orders, but the methods used are simply reversed for large offer, or sell orders. 
46 The most volatile stocks are most often targeted by HFTs, as the price 
volatility makes it easier to benefit from price swings. See Equity Market 
Structure Literature Review Part II: High Frequency Trading, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research 
/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf. 
47 LEWIS, supra note 13, at 73. 
48 See id. at 172; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609. 
49 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 172; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 
3609. 
50 Korsmo, supra note 4, at 546–48 (explaining that traders often break up large 
trades in order to prevent an unfavorable price movement). 
51 Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 22; Korsmo, supra note 4, at 546–
48. 
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100,000 shares of XYZ Company at $10.50, however, now only 2,000 
shares are available at that price. Rather than submitting the entire order 
and driving up the price, he uses an algorithm that will buy the 100,000 
shares in smaller lots over the next few minutes. Yet again, however, he 
ends up overpaying for the shares (or not getting them at all). Why?  
 This time around there was no large order to race to the next 
exchange, but the broker was still front-run. There are three likely ways 
in which a high-frequency trader could sniff out a hidden order. First, the 
high-frequency traders could have used sophisticated pattern recognition 
software that detected a large order by analyzing things such as trade 
volume, order size, etc.52 Second, the high-frequency traders could have 
identified the broker making the trade by using a latency table.53 A 
latency table is a table that can be used to identify traders based on how 
long it takes a trade to be routed to an exchange.54 For example, if it 
always takes 287 microseconds for a certain broker’s trade to travel 
between two specific exchanges, a glance at the latency table will 
identify the broker. Once the broker is identified, a simple look at 
historical trading data can help predict an incoming trading pattern.  
 The last and most common way high-frequency traders identify a 
sliced order is by repeatedly pinging the exchanges. 55  Pinging or 
“sniping” is a process that involves issuing hundreds of “immediate-or-
cancel” orders in a matter of milliseconds.56 An immediate-or-cancel 
order does exactly what you would expect: if it is not filled instantly, the 
order gets canceled. High-frequency traders use these orders to rapidly 
cycle through a wide range of orders, hoping to stumble upon a large 
hidden order.57 Once an order is detected, high-frequency traders will 
once again trade in front of the incoming order to capture the resulting 
price move.58  
 The speed at which all of this occurs is nearly incomprehensible. 
High-frequency traders place tens of thousands of orders to buy and sell 
per second.59 Algorithms analyze the data these orders generate and 
                                                      
52 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609. 
53 LEWIS, supra note 13, at 74. Latency tables are described by an individual 
interviewed by Lewis, but no information about them exists otherwise. Though 
again, this is highly valuable and proprietary information that HFTs would not 
likely divulge. 
54 Id.  
55 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609; Korsmo, supra note 4, at 548. 
56 Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25; Leis, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
57 Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25; Leis, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
58 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609; Leis, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
59 See, e.g., Bad HFT Algo Blasts 2.5 Million Bogus Orders, NANEX RESEARCH 
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4563.html.  
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rapidly take a position ahead of predicted incoming orders.60 This all 
happens several times faster than you can finish reading this sentence. 
B. Dark Pool Arbitrage 
 In response to much of the electronic front-running, some traders 
elected to move large trades into dark pools.61 Because dark pools do not 
have to report bids or offers until they are filled, the rationale was that 
large orders could be placed in dark pools and sit there until they were 
filled with no threat of being front-run by high-frequency traders.62 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Several dark pools have been 
accused of selling access to high-frequency traders and are now facing 
lawsuits and regulatory action. 63  Once high-frequency traders have 
access to a dark pool, they can easily front-run trades inside. According 
to Brad Katsuyama, President of IEX Group, a dark pool designed to 
eliminate front-running, “[y]ou could front-run an order in a dark pool on 
a bicycle.”64  
 When an investor places a large order inside a dark pool, the 
order should sit hidden until it is matched from within the dark pool, or it 
is matched with shares on an official exchange. For instance, if a broker 
places an order in a dark pool to buy 100,000 shares of XYZ Company at 
$10.50, it should sit until the order can be filled and no one should know 
it is there. If 100,000 shares of XYZ Company are offered for sale at 
$10.47 somewhere in the market, those shares should be matched with 
the buy order waiting in the dark pool. Instead, these orders are 
commonly filled at a price between the order and best available share 
price, $10.49 for instance.  
 These trades, though hidden, were once again front-run by high-
frequency traders. To detect hidden orders within a dark pool, high-
frequency traders utilize the same “pinging” and order cancellation 
techniques described above.65 Once an order has been sniffed out, the 
                                                      
60 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609. 
61 SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, A.I. BANDITS AND 
THE THREAT TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012); Batista, supra note 28; 
Allen Wastler, Dark Pools Letting Some Light in Now?, CNBC (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100409045.  
62 PATTERSON, supra note 61; Batista, supra note 28. 
63 For example, Barclays is facing a suit that alleges they defrauded their 
investors by lying about HFTs having access to their dark pool. See Complaint, 
Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital Inc., No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); see 
also Chad Bray, Credit Suisse Is Facing Inquires Over Its ‘Dark Pool’, 
NYTIMES DEALBOOK (July 31, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/ 
credit-suisse-facing-regulatory-inquiries-over-dark-pools/. 
64 LEWIS, supra note 13, at 123.  
65 See id. at 114–17, 228; Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25. 
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high-frequency traders will sit on it, waiting for a shift in the market that 
would otherwise fulfill the trade,66 such as when 100,000 shares of XYZ 
are offered below the $10.50 bid price. At this moment, the high-
frequency traders will race to the offered shares, buy them before the 
trade can be executed, and then sell them to the order waiting in the dark 
pool for the old, now stale, price before it can be updated.67  
 At the end of the day, all methods of front-running involve HFTs 
beating regular investors to the punch and outrunning market orders that 
would otherwise be filled. These firms act as a middleman to skim 
pennies off of trades that would have been executed in their absence. 
High-frequency traders do this without providing a benefit to the 
marketplace,68 such as increased liquidity, or carrying an affirmative 
obligation like market makers in the past.69 This is all enabled by HFTs’ 
speed and informational advantage.  
III. INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE 
 HFT is dependent on speed; so dependent that firms are willing 
to pay tens of thousands of dollars to shave a couple of milliseconds off 
of their latency time.70 But these HFT firms are not trying to stay ahead 
of institutional investors; rather they are competing against all of the 
other HFT firms. The two main ways HFT firms gain a speed advantage, 
and in turn informational advantage, is by using direct data feeds and 
colocation.  
A. Direct v. Consolidated Data Feeds 
 Regulation NMS created a national consolidated data feed, also 
known as the Securities Information Processor (“SIP”). 71  This 
consolidated data feed takes trading data from each individual trading 
venue and aggregates it into a single feed that represents the NBBO.72 
The SIP shows a real time snapshot of the U.S. equities market, and is 
                                                      
66 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 114–17, 228. 
67 Id. 
68 Harris, supra note 17. 
69 In the past certain traders known as “specialists” were given premier access to 
the marketplace, but in return they had to fulfill certain affirmative obligations. 
For example, most specialists were required to maintain active quotes in a 
certain market. If one side of a market dried up, they had to actively buy or sell 
for that side in order to maintain a certain level of liquidity. See Specialist, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/specialist.asp (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2015). 
70 See generally LEWIS, supra note 13, at 62-65. 
71 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01.  
72 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01; What is a SIP?, supra 
note 37. 
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used by nearly every investor.73 Even more importantly, the SIP is used 
by regulators to determine the NBBO at any particular point in time. 
Additionally, the SIP is used by each registered exchange, in at least 
some capacity, to price trades and determine the NBBO in their market.74  
 While the SIP, a consolidated feed, is certainly the most widely 
used, it is not the only method to observe the market in real time. The 
vast majority of high-frequency traders use a different aggregation 
method, known as direct feeds.75 Direct feeds, as the name implies, are 
purchased directly from the exchanges and then aggregated by the 
purchaser.76 Regulation NMS does not require exchanges to synchronize 
data delivery to consolidated and direct feeds, but forbids any one from 
providing information to a direct feed faster than the SIP.77 In fact, the 
SEC recently fined the NYSE for doing just that.78  
 If the exchanges are not allowed to provide data to direct feeds 
more quickly, why are HFT firms paying tens of thousands of dollars per 
month for access? Because even though direct feeds do not provide faster 
access, HFT firms are able to aggregate the data and create a picture of 
the market much faster than the SIP.79 Exactly how much faster is still up 
for debate. In 2010, the SEC estimated the delay between the SIP and 
direct data feeds to be less than ten milliseconds.80 However, in 2013 
Nanex Research presented evidence that the true delay was in fact twenty 
two milliseconds, an eternity in the age of HFT.81 Even using the SEC’s 
estimate, their findings stand in opposition of the stance taken in the case 
against the NYSE. In the press release, the Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement is quoted as saying, “[i]mproper early access to 
market data, even measured in milliseconds, can in today's markets be a 
                                                      
73  The Stock Market’s Perception Problem, NANEX RESEARCH (Aug. 1,  
2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4666.html. (The SIP has nearly 2.5 million 
subscribers.) 
74 Id. 
75 See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3606. 
76 Ding, Hanna & Hendershott, supra note 38, at 315–16. 
77 Regulation NMS Release No. 34,51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 (June 
29, 2005). 
78 Matt Krantz, Rigged Market? SEC Busts the NYSE, USA TODAY (May 
1, 2014), http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/05/01/rigged-market-sec-
busts-the-nyse/. 
79 HFT Front Running, All The Time, NANEX RESEARCH (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4442.html. 
80 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3611.  
81 HFT Front Running, supra note 79. 
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real and substantial advantage that disproportionately disadvantages 
retail and long-term investors.”82 
 Without question, access to direct data feeds provides high-
frequency traders with a distinct informational advantage.83 They can get 
consolidated market data substantially sooner than other market 
participants, enabling them to engage in practices such as front-running 
and dark pool arbitrage.  
B. Colocation 
 With all of the trading exchanges now being run by a bank of 
computer systems, and without the need for an actual trading floor, one 
would expect the physical locations housing the exchanges to shrink. But 
in fact, they have grown—some rather substantially.84 This expansion 
was fueled by demand from high-frequency traders to locate their trading 
systems closer and closer to the exchange system.85 The practice of 
housing your machine inside of an exchange, or “renting a rack,” is 
known as colocation.86 The reason high-frequency traders want to be so 
close to the exchange server is to reduce the latency between it and their 
own systems—that is to reduce the time it takes for messages to travel 
between them.87 Data is carried between these machines through fiber 
optic cables, which pass messages as rapid flashes of light. Light travels 
in a vacuum at 186,000 miles per second, or 186 miles per millisecond. 
This speed drops substantially inside a fiber optic cable, and the impact 
of reducing distance becomes even greater. Miles are equal to 
milliseconds, yards to microseconds, and feet can even be equated to 
nanoseconds.88 None of these are perceptible to humans, but in the race 
to be first, nanoseconds begin to add up. Colocation services offer a 
definite and measurable competitive advantage over other market 
participants, and are regarded by many as a clearly unfair practice.89  
                                                      
82 SEC Press Release 2012-189, SEC Charges New York Stock Exchange for 
Improper Distribution of Market Data (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with author). 
83 Email from Sal L. Arnuk & Joseph Saluzzi, Themis Trading, to Ms. Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n. (Apr. 21, 2010) (on file 
with author); HFT Front Running, supra note 79. 
84 The NYSE has grown to nearly 10 times its size when there was a physical 
trading floor. 
85 See generally LEWIS, supra note 13, at 62-65. 
86 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3610. 
87 Gomber et al., supra note 2, at 15; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 
3610. 
88 A nanosecond is one billionth of a second.  
89 Gomber et al., supra note 2, at 34–35; email from Arnuk & Saluzzi, supra 
note 83. 
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 The primary argument in favor of direct data feeds and 
colocation is that these services are available to anyone. However, each 
of these services costs tens of thousands of dollars per month, per 
exchange.90  The ability for exchanges to sell direct data feeds and 
colocation inside the exchange building creates a two-tiered market 
system consisting of those with the resources to purchase an 
informational advantage, and those without.91 Regulation NMS, which 
was designed to level the playing field, has instead created a marketplace 
with stark inequality between participants.  
IV. WHY IS THIS PROBLEMATIC? 
 While the actions of high-frequency traders and the current 
equities market structure likely come across as intuitively ‘unfair,’ the 
real problem is much more far-reaching. Asymmetric access to 
information and an advantageous trade structure92 have resulted in a two-
tiered system in which the privileged class is able to prey upon the 
other.93 Put simply, because some firms are able to purchase faster access 
to market information, those who do so have a distinct advantage over 
those who do not. This creates a textbook two-tiered system of ‘haves’ 
and ‘have nots.’ The creation of a two-tiered system is, however, not the 
only problem resulting from HFTs and asymmetric information. 
Concerns have been raised about a number of issues ranging from 
inherent unfairness94 to market destabilization, but a finer discussion of 
these problems is beyond the scope of this note.  
                                                      
90 For example, the total fees for all direct data feeds on the BATS exchange 
amount to $13,000 per month. Fee schedule available at http://www.batstrading 
.com/resources/regulation/rule_book/BZX_Fee_Schedule.pdf. 
91 See Gomber et al., supra note 2, at 34–35; email from Arnuk & Saluzzi, supra 
note 83. 
92 While a thorough discussion of trade structure is beyond the scope of this 
note, order routing protocols and most order types are both designed to be 
heavily in favor of HFTs. Exchanges operate in this way in order to capture the 
massive trade volume that HFTs generate. While no exchange will admit to 
favoring one type of client over another, a NYSE official did report that they are 
always competing for market share, and try to create products that will attract 
more volume. See Laurie Carver, Exchange Order Types Prompt Fears of HFT 
Conspiracy, RISK MAGAZINE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/feature/2261626/exchange-order-types-prompt-fears-of-hft-
conspiracy. 
93 See generally Eliot Lauer, Jason Gottlieb & Alyssa Astiz, High-Frequency 
Trading: Are the Exchanges the Next Targets?, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1042 
(June 3, 2013), http://www.curtis.com/siteFiles/News/curtis_lauer_gottlieb 
_astiz_article.pdf. 
94 After discussing the unfairness of asymmetric market information, Angel and 
McCabe conclude that it is not the ability to purchase better access to 
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The problems arising from a two-tiered system are severe, 
ranging from waning investor confidence to the eventual exit of certain 
participants from the marketplace.95 This is especially problematic for 
the U.S. equities market, as a well-functioning market for securities is 
vital to a robust economy. As investors lose confidence in the ability to 
effectively compete or to have their orders filled at the anticipated price, 
they are less willing to take action in the market. Some will even exit the 
market all together, as evidenced in various empirical studies.96 As fewer 
investors are willing to trade shares, the marketplace becomes more 
illiquid. Illiquidity directly affects the value of the underlying securities, 
and makes it more difficult for companies to secure a large amount of 
capital.97 There is some evidence that this phenomenon has already been 
occurring.98 For example, the average number of firms going public each 
year from 1990-2000 was 530.99 This number has fallen to roughly 125 
since 2001, a decrease of over 400%.100 This has a direct and substantial 
effect on the economy as a whole.  
Some critics claim that colocation and direct data feeds do not 
result in a two-tiered market system. The main argument raised is that 
these services are available for anyone who wishes to purchase them, and 
that the asymmetric information is a result of capitalism that needs no 
regulatory intervention.101 This reasoning is flawed for several reasons. 
First, the argument that anyone can purchase and utilize these services 
                                                                                                                         
information that is unfair, but rather the exploitative use of said information. “It 
is thus the use of the technology, rather than the technology itself, that 
determines fairness or unfairness.” See James Angel & Douglas McCabe, 
Fairness in Financial Markets: The Case of High Frequency Trading, (Dec. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737887.  
95 See Stephanie Ryder, How to Prevent Future Flash Crashes and Restore the 
Ordinary Investors' Confidence in the Financial Market: The Implementation of 
Circuit Breakers and Speed Limits to Help Enforce the Market Access Rule, 12 
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 265, 281–83 (2014). 
96 See, e.g., Computerized Trading: What Should the Rules of the Road Be?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking 
and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 20 (2012) (statement of David Lauer) (on file 
with author) (“[T]he flight of the retail investor during a period of incredible 
stock market returns is a sure sign that this exodus is a result of mistrust rather 
than economic conditions.”). 
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 See, e.g., Holly A. Bell, High Frequency Trading: Do Regulators Need to 
Control this Tool of Informationally Efficient Markets?, CATO INSTITUTE 
POLICY ANALYSIS (July 22, 2013), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files 
/pubs/pdf/pa731_web_1.pdf.  
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presupposes that all parties will benefit from them equally. However, this 
is not the case. These very expensive marginal increases in speed are 
much more likely to benefit high-frequency traders, who have the ability 
to execute thousands of trades per day, more than average institutional 
investors, who use more long-term trading strategies.102  
Second, while the SEC certainly has no duty to ensure that all 
parties are equal, creating barriers between market participants is in 
direct opposition with the stated purpose of Regulation NMS.103 In fact, 
the SEC has already commented on information asymmetry creating a 
two-tiered market system. In the proposed rule to eliminate flash 
orders,104 the SEC said, “[t]he flashing of order information could lead to 
a two-tiered market in which the public does not have access, through the 
consolidated quotation data streams, to information about the best 
available prices for U.S.-listed securities that is available to some market 
participants through proprietary data feeds.”105 While this release was 
focused on flash orders, the conclusions drawn by the SEC apply 
nonetheless. Informational asymmetries allow certain high-frequency 
traders to engage in predatory trading practices that take advantage of 
other investors who are not able or willing to pay for the same premier 
access to information. This two-tiered system is hazardous to the health 
of the equities market, and in turn to the economy as a whole.  
V. POTENTIAL SEC RESPONSES 
  While there have been a myriad of proposed responses to the 
problems this type of predatory trading generates, the more promising of 
these can be divided into target responses, and market and regulatory 
reforms. Targeted responses aim solely at combating the negative effects 
of HFT, whereas market and regulatory reforms seek to understand and 
reform the underlying issues that gave rise to this type of behavior. 
A. Targeted Responses 
1. Redefinition in the HFT Era 
 One of the major issues with policing HFT abuses is the 
definitional divide between HFT and LFT (low-frequency trading). 
Front-running, for example, can be defined as trading on the basis of 
                                                      
102 Michael A. Goldstein, Pavitra Kumar, and Frank C. Graves, Computerized 
and High-Frequency Trading, 49 THE FIN. REV. 2, 177–202 (2014). 
103 SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01. 
104 Now banned, the term flash order describes a practice in which exchanges 
used to flash new incoming order information to users with direct feeds fractions 
of a second before that information was released to the public.  
105 Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74 
Fed. Reg. 48,632, 48,634 (proposed Sept. 18, 2009). 
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non-public information about an upcoming trade in the same security.106 
To prove wrongdoing under this definition, one must show the 
possession of non-public information, and that a trade based on that 
information actually occurred. Before HFT, information was non-public 
if it had “not been disseminated in a manner which makes it generally 
available to the trading public through recognized channels of 
distribution.”107 In the world of HFT, however, this definition breaks 
down. Is information public if some traders have access to it before 
others? Does the analysis change if everyone can assess the information 
simultaneously, but only by paying a fee? What if anyone can access 
individual pieces of information, but only by using an algorithm to 
consolidate the pieces can you see the whole puzzle?  
 The ban on front-running, and other similar prohibitions, were 
enacted to protect traders, but only from abuses in the manner of trading 
at the time. In the past decade, trading has evolved, but the definitions in 
these protections have not. The SEC should consider amending many of 
the provisions banning front-running, and other parasitic trading 
practices, to reflect the evolution of the equities market. However, as 
shown above, the SEC must be careful to strike a delicate balance 
between protecting investors and stifling innovation.  
2. Real Time Monitoring 
 Another difficulty with policing predatory trading is 
reconstructing what actually happened in the market. An enormous 
amount of trading data is generated every day. For example, on January 
30th, 2015, there were 5,766,661 trades executed on the NYSE.108 The 
number of orders generated daily is in the tens of billions. Wading 
through all of this data is a monumental task, to say the least. Following 
the flash crash on May 6th, 2010, it took regulators several months to 
reconstruct less than an hour of trading data.109  This prompted the 
creation of the CAT, or consolidated audit trail. 
                                                      
106 See Exchange Act Release No. 14156, 1977 WL 190058 (Nov. 9, 1977). 
107  Jerry W. Markham, ‘Front-Running’ — Insider Trading Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69, 124 (1998). 
108 See Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2015, NYSE MARKET DATA, 
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table
&key=3141&category=3 (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
109 Gregg E. Berman, Senior Advisor to the Director, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n., 
Speech to 11th Annual SIFMA Market Structure Conference: Market 
Participants and the May 6 Flash Crash (Oct. 13, 2010). 
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 The CAT is designed to capture and consolidate all customer and 
order event information across all exchanges.110 This will, in theory, 
allow the SEC to more effectively regulate against illegal trading 
practices. 111  The final rule, passed in July of 2012, has yet to be 
implemented. As of February 2015, it is currently undergoing 
amendments concerning the “Process of Selecting a Plan Processor and 
Developing a Plan for the Consolidated Audit Trail.”112 Having a fully 
constructed record of all market data will be very useful during the 
investigation of significant market events, but probably not so much 
otherwise. Even if the information is readily available, it will still be an 
arduous task for regulators to wade through the sheer volume of activity 
in the marketplace. While this is certainly a step in the right direction, the 
SEC should consider adding some form of real-time monitoring to the 
CAT. This could likely be accomplished with an algorithm (like the ones 
used by HFTs) designed to flag suspicious trading activity for immediate 
action. Real-time monitoring would increase the usefulness of the CAT, 
while reducing the amount of time regulators have to spend wading 
through the audit trail.  
3. Speed Bumps 
Another potential response is an SEC mandated speed bump. 
This speed bump would be an intentional delay between when orders are 
received and when they are executed at each of the exchanges. While 
speed is paramount in today’s trading environment, this delay would be 
on the scale of a few milliseconds or even microseconds. It would be 
small enough that only traders employing these HFT strategies would be 
affected.  
A speed bump works by eliminating any advantage of getting 
there first, which is what allows high-frequency traders to front-run 
trades. A uniform delay on all trades, however, will not accomplish that 
goal. If an exchange were to delay all trades by, say, 0.5 seconds, HFT 
orders that got there first would still end up being executed first. The 
solution to that problem is a randomized delay. If an exchange were to 
implement a randomized delay that ranges from 10 to 200 milliseconds, 
for example, the first order to arrive at the exchange will not necessarily 
be the first one executed.113  This eliminates the pseudo first-mover 
                                                      
110 See Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67457, 104 SEC 
Docket 748 (July 18, 2012). 
111 Id. 
112 See Joint Industry Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 74223, 2015 WL 500130 
(Feb. 6, 2015). 
 
113 Bob Pisani, HFT: The Latest on Rebates, Taxes and 'Speed Bumps', CNBC 
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101553264.  
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advantage that HFTs gain through colocation and other informational 
and speed advantages. In fact, a few unofficial exchanges and dark pools 
have already been implementing some type of speed bump to curb HFT 
activity.114  
One of the more successful dark pools, known as IEX, has used a 
slightly different strategy to create a speed bump. Instead of creating a 
randomized delay, IEX elected to eliminate the speed and information 
advantage HFT firms get from being physically close to the exchange 
servers. To do so IEX wrapped 32 miles of fiber optic cable and placed it 
in a box right outside the exchange.115 To connect to IEX, traders have to 
travel through these miles of cable, which creates a delay of roughly 350 
microseconds.116 This delay gives IEX enough time to process and route 
trades to any exchange in the country before high-frequency traders have 
time to receive and act on that information. 
Currently IEX operates as a dark pool, but it has plans to 
eventually become a registered exchange.117 However, there is some 
question about whether IEX’s signature speed bump would be allowed to 
remain in place should it become registered.118 Regulation NMS, which 
governs the registered exchanges, contains some language that may be in 
conflict with an intentional speed bump. Specifically, regarding the 
immediate fulfillment of orders, Regulation NMS states that 
‘immediate,’ “precludes any coding of automated systems or other type 
of intentional device that would delay the action taken with respect to a 
quotation."119 Despite this language, there is some speculation that the 
SEC will revisit that provision if IEX applies to become an official 
exchange, given its rising popularity as a dark pool.120   
Additionally, various countries outside of the United States have 
implemented speed bumps in an effort to combat predatory trading by 
                                                      
114 Barbara Shecter, TMX Group to Install Speed Bump’ to Slow HFT Traffic, 
Ahead of Aequitas Launch, FINANCIAL POST (Oct. 23, 2014), http://business. 
financialpost.com/2014/10/23/tmx-group-to-install-speed-bump-to-slow-hft-
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115 LEWIS, supra note 13, at 178. 
116 Id.  
117 See About IEX, IEX, http://www.iextrading.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 
2016) (IEX is an exchange aimed at preventing front-running, and is the focus of 
Michael Lewis’s book). 
118 John McCrank, Exclusive: Upstart Trading Venue IEX May Prompt US 
Market Rule Change, REUTERS (July 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article 
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119 Regulation NMS Release No. 34,51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,534 (June 
29, 2005). 
120 McCrank, supra note 118.  
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high-frequency traders. The most successful of these speed bumps has 
been the one implemented by the E.U. The European Parliament 
unanimously voted in 2012 to impose a half-second speed limit on 
traders using computer algorithms to execute trades.121 This limit remains 
in effect today, and has evidently been successful in curbing some 
predatory trading.  
4. Order Randomization 
Order randomization is an idea that has been advanced along 
with speed bumps. Order randomization functions by grouping orders 
into batches as they arrive at an exchange. Once the orders are split into 
smaller lots, they are randomized before being executed. The underlying 
logic is that the first order to arrive will not necessarily be the first one 
executed. While this sounds great at first glance, it does not eliminate the 
HFT advantage. To overcome order randomization, high-frequency 
traders need only submit a huge amount of orders, even more than they 
do currently. 122  The orders coming in to an exchange using order 
randomization are broken into smaller batches that make it possible to 
randomize them without an impact processing speed. In other words, all 
orders inside a very small time window are randomized. To overcome 
this, high-frequency traders need only send hundreds and hundreds of 
orders all at the same time. The more HFT orders that get submitted, the 
more HFT orders make it into each batch. The law of large numbers tells 
us that the probability of an HFT order being executed first will 
eventually rise to a near certainty.  
Nevertheless, order randomization still has its merits. This 
strategy can be effectively used in conjunction with a speed bump or 
other randomized delay.123 This combination has shown some limited 
success thus far.124 
 
                                                      
121  See Derek Klobucher, Europe Takes Control of High-Speed Trading,  
FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/10/02/europe-
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122 LEWIS, supra note 13, at 174. 
123 Wanfeng Zhou & Nick Olivari, Exclusive: EBS Take New Step to Rein in 
High-Frequency Traders, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com 
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124  Joel Clark, Thomson Reuters to Trial Randomization on FX Matching 
Platform, EuroMoney (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.euromoney.com/Article 
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platform.html (explaining Thomson Reuters is implementing the system 
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5. Order Taxation 
 Order taxation is a response aimed at HFT as a whole, not 
specifically front-running. While such a tax could take many iterations, 
the general idea is that a very small tax would be placed on all trades. 
This tax would not have a noticeable effect on those taking long 
positions, but would be devastating to HFT firms who operate on very 
thin spreads. Order taxation has seen mixed reception, but has garnered 
some notable supporters in recent months, including Nobel laureate 
Joseph Stiglitz.125  
 Despite the increased support, a flat tax on all trades is a heavy-
handed approach that may even incentivize more predatory trading as 
legitimate HFT firms have their profit margins regulated away. In fact, 
some of the negative effects of a broad tax can be seen in France and 
Italy, who in 2012 both instituted a tax on all trades occurring in 0.5 
seconds or faster.126 While European trading volume as a whole was up 
14% from 2012 to 2013, the volumes in Italy and France both fell over 
10%.127 Whether this will have a long-term impact on those markets 
remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, a trade tax may still prove useful. A tax designed 
to target only predatory trading strategies, for instance, could be useful in 
curbing such activity. For example, a tax that applies only on trades 
made above a certain order-to-trade ratio may deter activities such as 
quote stuffing, which have no place in a legitimate trading strategy. A tax 
alone, however, is unlikely to solve the issue at hand, but it could be a 
valuable tool in conjunction with other potential SEC responses. 
B. Equities Market and Regulatory Review 
1. Regulation NMS Review 
 Regulation NMS was intended to increase competition among 
the exchanges, and in doing so has resulted in a highly fragmented 
marketplace. 128  This fragmentation and other key provisions of 
Regulation NMS have created an environment rife with predatory trading 
                                                      
125 See Steve Matthews, Stiglitz Calls High-Speed Trading “Front Running,” 
Suggests Tax, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2014), www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
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activity.129 The intention behind Regulation NMS was sound, but as the 
market has evolved, so must its regulations. Many market participants, 
including institutional investors, exchanges, and SEC officials, have 
called for a review of Regulation NMS.130 Echoing the thoughts of many, 
SEC member Luis Aguilar has called for regulators to review “whether 
Regulation NMS has created too much fragmentation and fostered an 
unreliable complexity in markets.”131 
 The key Regulation NMS provision under fire is the Trade 
Through Rule. As mentioned above, this rule requires brokers to accept 
the lowest (or highest) price available when purchasing (or selling) a 
stock, regardless of the exchange it is on.132 It does not allow them to 
“trade through” on a single marketplace at an inferior price.133 These 
rules were designed to protect investors from brokers making unsavory 
deals not in their best interest, but in reality, they have forced brokers to 
split up orders and route them to multiple exchanges, which has made it 
easier for HFT firms to front-run their trades.134 Many have called for a 
review of the current trade through rule, most notably among them SEC 
Commissioner Dan Gallagher,135 who has said, “I believe the trade-
through rule is a prime example of regulatory distortion of market 
competition.”136 A reconsideration of this rule may allow investors to 
consider when the costs of taking an inferior price outweigh the risks of 
being front-run by high-frequency traders. Overall, a comprehensive 
review of Regulation NMS would go a long way in repairing the current 
market environment that allows predatory traders to thrive.  
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2. Structural Reform 
 While the responses above have shown some limited success, the 
best way for the SEC to curb front-running and other predatory trading 
practices by high-frequency traders is to implement broad reforms to the 
current market structure. While a Band-Aid fix may temporarily resolve 
the problem, the best practice would be to revisit the regulations and 
market evolutions that allowed these activities to arise in the first place. 
The first, most troublesome issue that the SEC should consider is that 
regulated exchanges are catering to HFT firms at the expense of every 
other investor.137 The exchanges are selling faster access to information 
in the form of direct data feeds and colocation services. Allowing some 
users to pay for faster access to information has resulted in a textbook 
two-tiered marketplace, with HFT firms at the top and everyone else at 
the bottom.138 
 The biggest divide between high-frequency traders and 
traditional investors is the use of direct versus consolidated data feeds. 
Direct data feeds provide a picture of the current market several times 
faster than the consolidated feed, which in the era of lightning fast 
electronic trading, may as well be an eternity.139 SEC Chairwoman Mary 
Jo White recognizes the disparity between the consolidated feed, or SIP, 
and direct feeds, and plans to “continue efforts to minimize latency.”140 
She also plans to ask the exchanges to include a timestamp on 
consolidated trade data, which will allow investors using the SIP to judge 
exactly how delayed that data is, and to determine if the SIP fits their 
informational needs.141 While more transparency is always good, making 
the shortcomings of the SIP more identifiable does not change the fact 
that investors either have to settle for slow information or else pay tens 
of thousands of dollars per month for faster access. The only real 
solution to the problem is for the SEC to either spend the substantial 
amount of money it would take to eliminate the sizeable gap between the 
SIP and direct feeds, or to prohibit exchanges from selling raw data 
entirely. 
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 Colocation, while a part of the same issue, is a slightly more 
difficult problem to solve. If you cease to allow HFT firms to locate their 
servers inside the exchange building, they will just move them across the 
street to a private location as close to the exchange as possible. The only 
way to prevent the inevitable battle for real estate is to mandate that 
anyone who wants to connect to these exchanges must do so from a 
specified point of contact. While this idea may seem outlandish, it is not 
entirely without precedent. The SEC allowed the NYSE to force anyone 
who did not want to pay for colocation to connect at a specified location. 
The SEC could solve the colocation problem by instituting a similar 
requirement, just in reverse. Anyone who wants access to these 
exchanges must connect from this place. That would effectively 
eliminate the problem of colocation. 
 The last potential reform to be considered is one that would limit 
the ability of high-frequency traders to use predatory trading practices. 
This is known as a negative trading obligation. Negative trading 
obligations are nothing new, and have been a requirement for various 
classes of traders in the past.142 The most practical of these proposed 
obligations is a maximum order-to-trade ratio. As discussed before, one 
way HFT firms detect a large incoming trade is by submitting massive 
amounts of orders, in the hope that one of these collides with a hidden 
order. A maximum order-to-trade ratio would curb this practice by 
forcing HFT firms to maintain a certain amount of executed trades per 
order, and barring them from submitting hundreds of orders which they 
never intend to fill. Of course, this limit could have the potential side 
effect of “reducing market participants' ability to react to market 
exogenous events, but there is always a trade off between tighter 
regulation and market efficiency.”143 
  In January 2015, the SEC announced the creation of a “new 
Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee, which will focus on the 
structure and operations of the U.S. equities markets.”144 This committee 
is comprised of experts from different areas of the financial services 
industry, but there have been some questions about the impartiality of 
their selection. Most notably, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz had his 
nomination blocked after making public his views on HFTs.145 Despite 
                                                      
142 Id. (discussing negative trading obligations on market-makers in the manual 
trading day). 
143 Leis, supra note 15, at 75.  
144 Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., SEC Announces Members of New 
Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www 
.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-5.html#.VOzILLPF_t9. 
145  Dave Michaels, Stiglitz Blocked from SEC Panel After Faulting Speed 
Traders, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
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the concerns about its composition, this committee is a promising first 
step toward a reevaluation of the current equities market structure that 
has resulted in a harmful two-tiered marketplace.  
CONCLUSION 
 In the past decade the U.S. securities market has undergone 
drastic changes due to the exponential growth of technology. These 
technological advances have enabled us to trade more quickly and 
efficiently than ever before. However, some high-frequency traders are 
leveraging the technological and informational advantages created by a 
two-tiered marketplace to prey on other investors. These high-frequency 
traders are paying for expensive services like colocation and direct data 
feeds that give them an information and speed advantage that can be used 
to front-run the trades of institutional investors. This informational 
asymmetry has resulted in a two-tiered system in which the privileged 
class is receiving market information before everyone else. High-
frequency traders are using this premier access to information to prey on 
institutional investors. By jumping in front of these orders, high-
frequency traders enact a pseudo-tax on other investors without 
providing any benefit in return. The SEC has acknowledged the need to 
curtail predatory trading such as front-running and has multiple options 
to consider. A band-aid fix aimed exclusively at front-running, such as a 
speed bump or order randomization, could be very effective in the short 
term. However, the U.S. equities market would be much better served if 
the SEC committed itself to a structural reform and examined the 
regulations and market structure that have created an environment that is 
so hospitable to predatory trading.  
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